Mrs Petrova claimed that she was in contact with the doctors while Mr Petrovs was in hospital but that she was not told on 29 May that his condition was deteriorating nor was she asked whether he was an organ donor. Also, she was not asked whether, in the absence of any express wishes from her son, she would consent to his organs being donated for transplantation. In contrast, the Government claimed that the hospital did not have any contact details of relatives and so only the police were informed that Mr Petrovs was in hospital. Mrs Petrova argued that her rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) had been breached because Mr Petrovs' organs had been removed without either his prior consent or her consent. She claimed that as she was one of his closest relatives she should have been informed of the removal of his organs and that because this did not occur, she could not exercise her right to express consent or refusal to the removal of her son's organs under Latvian law.
28 As such, she had been subject to inhuman and degrading treatment and her right to private and family life had been interfered with.
There are some similarities between the facts of Elberte and those of Petrova, but an important difference is that in Elberte there was a criminal inquiry into the removal of tissue from Mrs Elberte's husband and others, but no complaints were successful. It is thus necessary to set out the relevant facts of Elberte and to, briefly, summarise the elements of the inquiry and its results.
Mr Elberts (the applicant's husband) was involved in a car accident on 19 May 2001 and he died in an ambulance on the way to the hospital. The following day his body was taken to a forensic centre for a post-mortem to establish the cause of death. Mrs Elberte, who was pregnant with their second child, first saw Mr Elberts' body when it was transported from the forensic centre for the funeral and she saw that his legs were tied together. parents, siblings or spouse), did not object, then organs and tissues could be removed.
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Despite these provisions, during the criminal inquiry it transpired that there was disagreement over which of two different legal systems for regulating the removal of organs and tissue applied -presumed consent or informed consent. The head and experts from the forensic centre where the tissue from Mr Elberts were removed, believed that at the relevant time there was a system of presumed consent in Latvia, meaning that 'everything which is not forbidden is allowed'. 35 In contrast, the investigators leading the criminal inquiry believed that the Latvian legal system relied on informed consent, so that 'removal was permissible 29 Elberte, para. 14. 30 'it remains unclear how the "presumed consent system", as established under the Latvian law, operates in practice in circumstances in which the applicant found herself, whereby she had certain rights as the closest relative but was not informedlet alone provided with any explanation -as to how and when these rights might have to be exercised'.
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The uncertainty and lack of clarity surrounding the law was evidenced not only by the disagreement between the Security Police and Prosecutor's Office and the Minister for Health as to whether the failure to inform Mrs Petrova of the possible removal of her son's organs broke Latvian law, but also by the fact that the legislation was subsequently changed. provides a mechanism for an individual's relationship with a relative to continue after their death as it enables relatives to decide on behalf of the deceased whether to donate their organs. In doing so, the law on organ and tissue removal and use challenges the traditional approach to health care decision-making where, as Roy Gilbar suggests, English law and professional ethical guidelines relating to decisions by adults with capacity rely on an individual expressing her autonomy. 77 In contrast, the decision as to whether an individual's organs and tissues are removed and used can be made by the relatives of the deceased, who could be respecting the autonomy of their deceased relative by expressing their wishes, but may, of course, use this as an opportunity to exert their own autonomy and make the decision that they prefer.
Applying English law to a factually similar case to that of Petrova or Elberte, before the organ or tissue can be removed from an adult appropriate consent must be provided from one of three parties, as set out above. The Act contains no further information on how this consent should be provided or obtained, but guidance can be found in the Human Tissue following their death'. 78 Seeking consent from the now-deceased prior to death or from their relatives or those close to them after death, 'requires sensitivity', 79 and when 'those close to the deceased' object to the activity but the deceased or their nominated representative has explicitly consented to it, 'the healthcare professional should seek to discuss the matter sensitively with them. 
Some Concluding Thoughts
We concur with Judge Wojtyczek that both Petrova and Elberte rightly fell within the family life aspect of Article 8, and suggest that the ECtHR's decisions in these cases emphasise the autonomy of the deceased and the autonomy of their relatives, rather than the relational autonomy of the deceased. As such, we disagree with the reasoning presented in these cases.
If the ECtHR had adopted the notion of relational autonomy under the family life aspect of Article 8, then the same decisions could have been reached; however, the right to decide would have been appropriately located as belonging to Mr Petrov and Mr Elbert (the deceased), with their relatives' roles limited to voicing the wishes of their relatives and not their own personal views. Given the primacy accorded to bodily autonomy and integrity, and its recognised inclusion within the ambit of Article 8, 103 we argue that this is the preferred foundation on which to base laws on organ and tissue removal and use. Indeed, as the law in England indicates, it is possible to include all three approaches to autonomy within a donation system, with priority rightly given to the autonomy of the deceased, the relational context of decisions recognised, and the autonomy of relations also appreciated.
We hope that legislators and regulators reflect on the decisions in these cases and consider not only whether their laws and organ and tissue removal and use systems would permit such cases to be brought to court, 104 but also what form of autonomy is recognised within those systems. We also hope that if, in the context of organ and tissue removal and use, the ECtHR continues to recognise the autonomy of relations as opposed to relational autonomy, when the relevant provisions permit either approach to be recognised, then its reasons for doing so are clearly set out and the consequences and implications are explicitly addressed. What, for example, might the ECtHR's response be to a case where the relative's own right under
